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ONCE IS ENOUGH: THE NEED TO APPLY THE FULL
ELLERTH/FARAGHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN
SINGLE INCIDENT AND INCIPIENT HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
By Charles W. Garrison+
In 1964, the House of Representatives held what today would be considered
a historic debate on an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The amendment proposed adding “sex” as a protected class under the bill,
making it illegal for employers to discriminate on the basis of gender.1 Yet,
the historic nature of the amendment was not apparent to the representatives at
the time, and one Justice Department official remarked, “They thought it was a
joke. They didn’t think there was any discrimination against women that
mattered. They were laughing down on the floor as they were talking about
it.” 2 Despite the levity in the House, “sex” was added to Title VII and
remained in the final bill.3 In the mid-1970s, courts determined that sexual

+
J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of American, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2004, Bates College. The author wishes to thank Professor Suzette Malveaux for her
guidance and assistance during this process. Additionally, many thanks to the members of the
Catholic University Law Review for their contributions to this Comment. Finally, a special
thanks to my family and friends for their love and support, especially to my father for his years of
providing me with writing advice and “constructive criticism.”
1. CARRIE N. BAKER, THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT 14–15
(2008). The amendment to add “sex” as a protected class was offered by Representative Howard
Smith, an opponent of the Civil Rights Act, whom many argue proposed the amendment as a
“congressional joke” designed to defeat the bill. ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT IS SEXUAL
HARASSMENT? FROM CAPITOL HILL TO SORBORNE 28 (2003). Courts have acknowledged this
motive in discussing the legislative history of Title VII. See e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (“This Court . . . is well aware that the sex
discrimination prohibition was added to Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil rights opponent
Howard W. Smith. But the joke backfired on Smith when the amendment was adopted . . . .”)
aff’d, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court has used more muted terms, but noted
that “[t]he prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last
minute on the floor of the House . . . and we are left with little legislative history to guide us in
interpreting of the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex.’” Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986). See generally Robert C. Bird, More than a
Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look a the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 137 (1997) (providing a discussion of the
rationale for the inclusion of the amendment and an argument that the conventional wisdom
surrounding it is incorrect).
2. BAKER, supra note 1, at 15.
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TITLES VII AND IX OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,
3213–32–32 (1964) (debating and adopting the Smith Amendment); Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)).
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harassment was a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII.4 In
the subsequent decades, Title VII has become one of the most effective tools in
combating sexual harassment in the workplace.5 Even so, courts struggle to
adopt clear standards for determining what constitutes sexual harassment and
when an employer should be liable for sexual harassment under Title VII.6
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from workplace
discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.7 Title
VII accomplishes this important objective by allowing employees who suffer
discrimination to recover damages or other remedies from their employers.8
Although the term “sexual harassment” does not appear in the text of Title VII,
employers can be held vicariously liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment
of an employee.9
Broadly, courts recognize two categories of sexual harassment as actionable
under Title VII, triggering various degrees of employer liability.10 The most
blatant category, sometimes called “quid pro quo” harassment, where an
employer conditions an employees job status or takes a tangible employment
4. See infra Part I.B.; Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C Cir. 1977), is generally
regarded as the first appellate-level case recognizing sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination actionable under Title VII. SAGUY, supra note 1, at 31 (2003). In Costle, a
woman brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim against her employer after she was fired for
refusing the sexual advances of her superior. Costle, 561 F.2d at 984-85. The D.C. Court of
Appeals stated that at “no time during our intensive study of this case have we encountered
anything to support the notion that employment conditions summoning sexual relations between
employees and superiors are somehow exempted from the coverage of Title VII . . . [A]gainst this
backdrop, we cannot doubt that Title VII intercepts the discriminatory practice charged here.” Id.
at 994–95. In the same year, the Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal also recognized
sexual harassment as actionable under Title VII. See Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568
F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., 568 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir.
1977).
5. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, PRIMER ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1
(1992) (describing Title VII as “[c]hief” among the laws prohibiting sexual harassment); Eileen
Goldsmith, Sexual Harassment: Legal Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYC. OF SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIS., 13982, 13982 (Paul B. Bates and Neil J. Smelse eds., 2001) (“Title VII
remains the primary legal weapon against sexual harassment in the United States . . . .”).
6. See e.g., Aric G. Elsenheimer, Agency and Liability in Sexual Harassment Law: Toward
a Broader Definition of Tangible Employment Actions, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2005). It
has been suggested that the court’s struggle in defining the scope of employer liability under Title
VII stems from a lack of definition of unlawful harassment. See GAVIN S. APPLEBY,
HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER WORKPLACE LANDMINES 61 (2008).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (declaring that a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge by the “person claiming to be aggrieved” or by any person whom
the charge claims was aggrieved by the alleged “unlawful employment practice”).
9. CAROL M. MERCHASIN, MINDY H. CHAPMAN & JEFF POLINSKY, CASE DISMISSED!
TAKING YOUR HARASSMENT PREVENTION TRAINING TO TRIAL 4-5 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing
situations in which courts have held employers liable for sexual harassment).
10. JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30253, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 11 (2008).
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action based on the employee’s submission to a supervisor’s harassing
actions. 11 The United States Supreme Court has held that employers are
strictly liable for harassment that results in a tangible employment action.12
The second category of sexual harassment called a “hostile work environment
claim” occurs when no action is taken against the employee, but the
supervisor’s harassment is so severe or pervasive that it makes the workplace
“hostile” or “abusive” for the employee.13
In 1998, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, the Supreme Court issued two rulings regarding employer liability
in hostile work-environment actions.14 In both cases, the Court held that an
employer is liable for hostile work-environment claims created by a
supervisor’s sexual harassment. 15 However, the Court limited employer
liability when no tangible employment action is taken, where the employer
proves, “(a) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any harassing behavior, and (b) the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” 16 Although this affirmative
defense appears straightforward, 17 circuit courts are split as to whether an
employer must prove both elements of the Ellerth and Faragher affirmative
defense in two situations: (1) incipient, or early-stage, hostile
work-environment claims in which an employer remedies the harassment after
notification; and (2) single-incident situations in which one act of harassment
creates a hostile work environment.18
Less than one year after Ellerth and Faragher, in Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district
court’s dismissal of a hostile work-environment claim because the employer
took prompt and proper action to address the harassment after the employee
11. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1980) (defining the category as harassment in which
“submission to or rejection of [the unwelcomed sexual] conduct . . . is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting” the employee); see also FEDER, supra note 10, at 11.
12. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986) (Marshall, J. concurring)
(noting unanimity among federal appellate courts that employers should be strictly liable for
quid pro quo harassment); see also Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (“[A]
tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the
employer.”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790–91 (1998) (quoting BARBARA
LINDEMAN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 776 (3d ed. 1996))
(“[C]ourts hold employers ‘automatically liable’ in quid pro quo cases because the ‘supervisor’s
actions . . . are deemed as a matter of law those of the employer.’”).
13. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see FEDER, supra note 10, at 11.
14. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790–91.
15. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790–91.
16. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765–66; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
17. See, e.g., Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 796 (5th Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter Indest II] (Weiner, J., specially concurring) (characterizing the Ellerth and Faragher
rule as “remarkably straightforward and perfectly consistent”).
18. See infra Parts I.E, I.F.

1134

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:1131

complained. 19 The court held that Ellerth and Faragher did not control in
cases involving an “incipient hostile environment” when the employer took
timely action to “nip [the] hostile environment in the bud.” 20 Stated
differently, the Fifth Circuit devised a new rule for incipient
hostile-environment claims, allowing employers to escape liability by
satisfying only the first element of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.21
Similarly, in McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that an employer does not have to establish the second
element of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in a hostile
work-environment case stemming from a single incident of harassment.22 The
court analogized the application of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to
single-incident cases as “trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.”23
Despite the Fifth and Eighth Circuit precedent, other circuits have faithfully
applied both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. In
Harrison v. Eddy Potash Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
upheld a district court’s use of the full Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in
a hostile work-environment case, despite an employer’s prompt action to
redress the harassment.24 Last year, in Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held that an
employer must establish both elements of the affirmative defense in a
single-incident hostile work-environment case.25
This Comment examines the appropriate application of the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense to hostile work-environment cases involving incipient and
single incident sexual harassment by a supervisor. Part I provides an overview
of employer liability under Title VII and a history of sexual harassment
liability by examining statutory provisions, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) guidance, and Supreme Court precedent. Part I also
explains the development of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense and
describes the current circuit split on its application in single incident and
incipient hostile work-environment claims. Part II analyzes this circuit split by
evaluating the decisions in light of Ellerth and Faragher, policy concerns, and
Title VII’s legislative history and underlying policy goals. This Comment
argues that the Tenth Circuit and Northern District of Indiana’s application of
19. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc. 164 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Indest
I].
20. Id. at 265–67.
21. Id. at 267 (stating that a company’s prompt response to a harassment complaint relieves
it of liability).
22. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771–72 (8th Cir 2004) (noting that the
Supreme Court did not “change course” in its sexual harassment jurisprudence).
23. Id. at 771.
24. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1027 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming the
district court’s use of jury instructions based on both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher defense).
25. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 946 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
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both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense better serves Title
VII’s goal of deterrence by encouraging employers and employees to take
proactive steps to prevent harassment. Part III contends that incentivizing
reporting of harassment is even more imperative in the current job market, as
employees feel increased pressure to endure harassment rather than to risk
losing or leaving their jobs. Further, this Comment urges the Supreme Court to
resolve this circuit split by finding that both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense should govern single-incident and incipient hostile
work-environment claims, as this approach best preserves Title VII as a strong
tool to fight workplace discrimination.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Title VII and Employer Liability
The prohibition of employment discrimination under Section 703 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to afford economic
opportunity to African Americans and other minority groups that had long
been denied jobs due to their minority status. 26 The statute prohibits an
employer or “any agent of such person” 27 from discriminating in hiring or
firing or discriminating “with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment” based on the employee’s “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”28
Courts recognize that Title VII has dual goals of (1) deterring
discrimination, and (2) redressing harm by requiring violators to compensate
victims of discrimination. 29 Title VII seeks to deter discrimination by
imposing on employers “civil liability for civil rights violations.”30 Implicit in
this philosophy lies the belief that employers will take proactive steps to create
a workplace free of discrimination if faced with potential civil liability.31
Because of the inclusion of “agents,” courts have looked to basic common
law agency doctrine for guidance when determining employer liability for
26. See 110 CONG. REC. 6547 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (reciting statistics that
documented the effect of discrimination of nonwhites in the workplace and noting that “no civil
rights legislation would be complete unless it dealt with this problem”).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
28. § 2000e-2.
29. Id.; see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (noting
that deterrence and victim compensation are two purposes of Title VII); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co.,
466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant purpose of the Title, of course, is to root out
discrimination in employment.”).
30. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Civil Remedies: Vicarious
Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 756
(1999).
31. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (“The purposes underlying Title
VII are similarly advanced where employers are encouraged to adopt antidiscrimination policies
and to educate their personnel on Title VII’s prohibitions.”).
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discriminatory acts by an employee. 32 Of particular importance in liability
questions is the agency doctrine of respondeat superior, which holds an
employer vicariously liable for “torts committed by employees while acting
within the scope of their employment.” 33 Additionally, an employer can be
held liable even when employees commit a tort outside the “scope of their
employment” if the employer negligently or recklessly allows the action, or if
the employee’s conduct is aided by his agency relation with the employer.34
Despite Title VII’s twin goals of deterrence and compensation,35 the statute
remains silent on the scope of vicarious liability for employers.36 In hostile
work-environment cases where a supervisor discriminates against or sexually
harasses an employee but the employee’s job status is not altered, the
employer’s connection to the harassment is more attenuated because the
supervisor did not overtly exert his or her supervisory power by taking
employment action against the employee. 37 In these cases, courts have
struggled to develop clear rules for employer liability. This uncertainty was
especially prevalent in the decade following the passage of Title VII when
women first tried to use Title VII to combat sexual harassment at work.38

32. See e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (declining to give a
definitive rule on employer liability, but noting that Congress wanted the courts to look to
common agency principles for guidance).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). The Restatement defines agency as
“the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another
person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” Id. § 1.01. For instance,
when a supervisor, authorized by the employer to make decisions that affect an employee’s job
status, fires an employee based on the employee’s sex, the employer can be held vicariously
liable. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75–77 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the Court’s
application of strict liability in tangible employment-action cases).
34. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05(1) (“A principal who conducts an
activity through an agent is subject to liability for harm to a third party caused by the agent’s
conduct if the harm was caused by the principal’s negligence in selecting, training, retaining,
supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent.”).
35. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (explaining that employer
liability for discrimination not only compensates the victim, but it also bolsters Title VII’s
broader goal of ending workplace discrimination). Broader liability encourages employers to
ensure that there is no discrimination and also allows victims of workplace discrimination to seek
compensation from the “deeper pocket[ed]” employers rather than the individual employee who
actually violates the law. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 757.
36. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 762 (speculating that this silence is likely due to
the fact that Congress designed Title VII with overtly discriminatory employment practices in
mind, such as hiring or firing due to race, where establishing employer liability would not be
problematic).
37. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 76–77 (Marshall, J., concurring). This position is the subject of
some debate, as a supervisor is also tasked with oversight and regulation of the workplace,
thereby enabling a supervisor’s actions to create a hostile environment. Id.
38. SAGUY, supra note 1, at 28–30.
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B. Establishing Sexual Harassment as a Form of Actionable Discrimination
Under Title VII
The unprecedented influx of women into the workforce in the second half of
the twentieth century39 marked one of the biggest societal and economic shifts
in American history. 40 Despite this breakthrough, women entering the
workforce in the 1960s and 1970s faced severe discrimination 41 and sexual
harassment. 42 As the degree and prevalence of sexual harassment came to
light, women’s groups began to publicize the problem and search for legal
remedies under Title VII. 43 The groups argued that sexual harassment was
covered under Title VII when an employee’s job status was tied to unwanted
sexual advances by a supervisor (quid pro quo harassment) because this
behavior creates an employment barrier that would not be otherwise present

39. In 1950, approximately thirty-three percent of women participated in the labor force; by
1980 that number skyrocketed to over fifty percent. Howard N. Fullerton Jr., Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Labor Force Participation: 75 Years of Change, 1950–98 and 1998–2025, MONTHLY
LABOR REV., Dec. 1999, at 3–5, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1999/12/art1full.pdf.
40. Harold V. Hayghe, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Developments in Women’s Labor Force
Sept.
1997,
at
41,
available
at
Participation,
Monthly
Labor
Rev.,
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1997/09/art6full.pdf; see also Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling
and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical and Legal Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 581, 591–92 (1997) (attributing the rise of women in the workplace to cultural
and historical factors, including increased educational opportunities, more progressive views of
gender roles, the rising cost of living, and antidiscrimination laws).
41. Bridge, supra note 40, at 591–93. Although there was a significant increase in the
presence of women in the workforce, women still faced discrimination in hiring, salary, and
promotions. Id. at 592. A 1963 report by the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women,
commissioned by President Kennedy and chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, also uncovered
widespread gender discrimination against women in hiring and pay. BAKER, supra note 1, at 13.
The report prompted President Kennedy to issue an executive order that prohibited sexual
discrimination in the hiring of federal workers. Id.
42. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 26–27 (1979). Redbook Magazine’s 1976 poll surveying 9,000 women
reported that nine out of ten women experienced sexual harassment at work. Id. at 26–27.
Similarly, a 1981 study of federal workers found that forty-two percent of females had been
victims of sexual harassment. Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Is It a Problem?,
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD (1981), reprinted in LAURA W. STEIN, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENT HISTORY 19 2–21 (1999). Scholars point to the
treatment of female slaves as an example of early sexual harassment before the term was coined
in the 1970s. See e.g., Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 3–8 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., 2004).
43. See Susan Brownmiller & Delores Alexander, How We Got Here: From Carmita Wood
to Anita Hill (1992), reprinted in STEIN, supra note 42, at 1–2 (discussing the grassroots effort to
publicize sexual harassment in the early 1970s); see also Enid Nemy, Women Begin to Speak Out
Against Sexual Harassment at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1975, at 38 (chronicling women’s
groups’ attempts to raise awareness about sexual harassment and their search for legal remedies).
Nemy’s article was among the first mainstream press given to the subject of sexual harassment
and was widely syndicated in newspapers across the country. BAKER, supra note 1, at 35–36.
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but for the employee’s sex. 44 Initially, courts dismissed the argument that
sexual harassment rose to the level of discrimination,45 reading Title VII as
prohibiting only employment discrimination based on sex stereotypes in hiring
or firing practices.46
Notwithstanding early setbacks, the law evolved over time. First, Congress
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended Title
VII to strengthen the enforcement power of the EEOC, 47 and reaffirmed
Congress’s intent to end sex discrimination in employment.48 Second, in 1976,
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia issued a landmark ruling
in Williams v. Saxbe that recognized quid pro quo sexual harassment as
discrimination under Title VII.49 The Williams court broadly read Title VII’s
intent as prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination, including sexual
harassment. 50 Additionally, the court in Williams found the employer
vicariously liable for the supervisor’s decision to tie employment status to the
employee’s reaction to his sexual advances.51 The D.C. Court’s ruling gave
44. See SAGUY, supra note 1, at 29–30 (discussing the strategy of framing sexual
harassment as a Title VII issue).
45. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 235–36 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (finding no
liability for the employer in a quid pro quo claim by a female employee who was fired for
refusing to have sex with a supervisor because the employee failed to report the conduct), rev’d,
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp 161, 163 (D. Ariz.
1975) (finding that plaintiff’s complaint alleging verbal and sexual advances did not qualify as an
“unlawful employment practice” that fell within the scope of Title VII), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th
Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73, 13 FEP Cases 123, 1974 WL 10628 (D.D.C. Aug. 9,
1974) (characterizing sexual harassment as an interpersonal problem between employees rather
than workplace sex discrimination), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
46. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. 444 F.2d 1194, 1197–98 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding
that firing a female employee based on marital status violated Title VII). The Sprogis court
explained that a prohibition on employment practices based on gender stereotypes fell within
Title VII’s goal of eliminating workplace sex discrimination. Id. at 1198.
47. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972);
see H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 8–17 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2143–53
[hereinafter H.R. REP. NO 92-238] (discussing enhanced enforcement for the EEOC); see also
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77–78 (explaining that Congress’s hope that employers
would voluntarily comply with Title VII was overly optimistic and thereby led Congress to
strengthen the EEOC’s investigatory and enforcement powers in 1972).
48. H.R. REP. NO 92-238, supra note 47, at 65. Congress noted that sex discrimination
continued to be widespread and as significant as other forms of employment discrimination. Id.
49. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp 654, 654–57 (D.D.C. 1976).
50. Id. at 657 (noting that “sex discrimination” as used in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act encompassed a wide range of discriminatory practices). The Williams court
rejected the argument that a sexually harassed employee was discriminated against because she
refused sex, rather than because of her gender, stating that the argument ignored the fact that the
harassment created a barrier to employment that is only present but for the employee’s gender.
Id. at 657–58.
51. Id. at 660–61 (explaining that Title VII was violated when the supervisor sexually
harassed the plaintiff, and that the supervisor’s actions were imputed to the employer). The court
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courts across the country the much-needed impetus to begin to recognize quid
pro quo harassment claims under Title VII.52
The 1970s and early 1980s also saw the development of hostile
work-environment discrimination claims. In 1971, the Fifth Circuit held in
Rogers v. EEOC that Title VII prohibited employment practices or supervisor
conduct that did not tangibly alter the employment status of an employee but
created a racially hostile work environment.53 Ten years later, in Bundy v.
Jackson, the D.C. Circuit applied the same reasoning in the gender context
when it held that sexual harassment could create an actionable hostile work
environment.54
C. The 1980 EEOC Guidance
Despite these positive developments, sexual harassment litigation remained
unsettled.55 As a result, in 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines56 that defined
sexual harassment generally, 57 recognizing both quid pro quo harassment 58

went on to quell concerns that this finding would expose employers to too much liability. Id.
The court explained that Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment conditions from being
imposed on an employee based on sex, and that holding employers vicariously liable for a
supervisor’s actions falls within the statute. Id.
52. See Tompkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048–49 (3d Cir. 1977);
Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73, 13 FEP Cases 123, 1974 WL 10628 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974), rev’d
sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55, 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also BAKER, supra
note 1, at 22–25 (discussing the significance of the Williams decision); GWENDOLYN MINK,
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICAL BETRAYAL OF SEXUALLY HARASSED WOMEN 48–51
(2000) (discussing the impact of the Williams decision and the subsequent history of Barnes,
Tompkins, and Corne).
53. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (defining a hostile work
environment as one “so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers”).
54. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.3d 935, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Bundy court noted that if
employers were not liable for a hostile work environment created by sexual harassment, “an
employer could sexually harass a female employee with impunity by carefully stopping short of
firing the employee or taking any other tangible actions against her.” Id.
55. See David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual
Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1721 (2002) (noting that quid pro quo and hostile
work-environment cases did not address “garden variety sexual harassment” wherein humiliation
or other non-sexual motivations arose).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980); see also Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1721.
57. § 1604.11(a) (defining sexual harassment as “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature”).
58. The Commission stated quid pro quo harassment occurred when “(1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis
for employment decisions affecting such individual.” Id.
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and hostile work-environment harassment 59 as actionable under Title VII. 60
The guidelines also imposed liability on employers if the employer or the
employer’s agents knew or should have known about the harassment, unless
the employer or agent took adequate corrective actions. 61 Additionally, the
EEOC reaffirmed Title VII’s prevention goal by urging employers to use
preventative steps to curb sexual harassment.62
D. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson: Supreme Court Recognition of
Sexual Harassment as Discrimination
Ten years after the Williams court recognized sexual harassment as a form of
employment discrimination, the Supreme Court finally addressed Title VII
sexual harassment claims in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.63 Justice
William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, began his analysis by recognizing
that sexual harassment constituted a form of sex discrimination, and that Title
VII’s prohibition against gender discrimination was not limited to harassment
that resulted in “economic” or “tangible” discrimination.64 Echoing the EEOC
guidelines, 65 the Court recognized two basic types of sexual harassment as
actionable under Title VII: (1) quid pro quo, where harassment results in a
tangible employment action; and (2) hostile work environment, where an
employee’s status is unaffected but the sexual harassment is “sufficiently
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and
create an abusive working environment.’”66
Despite establishing a Title VII claim for sexual harassment, the Court did
not define the scope of employer liability.67 The Court rejected the view that
59. The Commission defined hostile work-environment sexual harassment as involving
“such conduct [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” Id.
60. § 1604.11(c).
61. § 1604.11(d).
62. § 1604.11(e) (providing that an employer must affirmatively prevent sexual harassment
from occurring by raising the subject of harassment, expressing disapproval of harassing conduct,
and imposing sanctions).
63. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (1986).
64. Id. at 64. Justice William Rehnquist interpreted the phrase “terms, conditions or
privileges of employment” in Title VII to mean that Congress intended to broadly “‘strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.” Id. (quoting L.A.
Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978), vacated, 461 U.S. 951
(1983)).
65. Id. at 65 (explaining that while the EEOC guidelines are not controlling, litigants and
courts can refer to them for guidance). The EEOC also filed an amicus brief on behalf of Vinson,
arguing that a hostile work-environment claim can prevail even when no adverse employment
action took place. Id. at 70–71.
66. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 867, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
67. Id. at 70, 72 (declining to create a definitive rule on employer liability but noting that it
agreed with “the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in
this area”).
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an employer should be “automatically liable” for sexual harassment by
supervisors, but also declared that the mere existence of a complaint procedure
did not shield an employer from all liability.68 Thus, the Court remanded the
case to determine if the supervisor’s conduct was “severe or pervasive” enough
to constitute an actionable Title VII claim. 69 The lack of direction by the
Supreme Court on the issue of employer liability resulted in continued
struggles by the lower courts to determine liability in hostile workenvironment claims.70
E. Ellerth and Faragher: The Court Clarifies Liability
Sexual harassment claims greatly increased following Meritor 71 and
Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 72 After a number of
highly publicized scandals, sexual harassment became a hotly debated issue,
and the Supreme Court was urged to address the matter.73
Finally, in 1998, the Supreme Court announced Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth 74 and Faragaher v. City of Boca Raton, 75 providing much-needed
68. Id. at 72–73. Justice Rehnquist explained that under agency principles courts have
correctly held employers strictly liable for tangible employment actions. Id. at 70–72 (explaining
that lower courts consistently held employers liable for quid pro quo harassment).
69. Id. at 72–73.
70. For a discussion of the impact of the Meritor decision, see Elsenheimer, supra note 6, at
1641–42. See also B. Glenn George, If You’re Not Part of the Solution, You’re Part of the
Problem: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 137 (2001)
(noting the courts’ struggle with employer liability until 1998); John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors,
and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious SummaryJudgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment
Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1414 nn. 69–71 (2002) (listing cases that hold
employers vicariously liable, and cases that apply a “knew-or-should-have-known standard.”).
71. From 1980 to 1985, the EEOC received only sixteen Title VII complaints, but following
the Meritor decision, 624 charges were filed in 1986 and 1658 charges were filed in 1987.
Kristin H. Berger Parker, Ambient Harassment Under Title VII: Reconsidering the Workplace
Environment, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 945, 953 (2008).
72. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 105-1071 (1991) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added provisions expanding the
rights of women to sue and collect compensatory and punitive damages for sexual discrimination
or harassment, which led to more litigation surrounding sexual harassment, and heightened the
need for more clearly defined liability standards. See Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife
Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 320–21 (2004).
73. See MINK, supra note 52, at 97–102 (discussing high profile sexual harassment cases
including the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court nomination hearing, which focused on his alleged
sexual harassment of Anita Hill while Thomas was Commissioner of the EEOC). Senator
Edward Kennedy, a chief opponent of Thomas’s Supreme Court nomination, commented that due
to Anita Hill’s testimony, the general public had a greater understanding of the severity of sexual
harassment. STEIN, supra note 42 at 116–19; see also, Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1692–96 (1998) (chronicling the litany of sexual harassment
news stories in the 1990s).
74. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
75. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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direction on the question of employer liability in hostile work-environment
claims.76 These rulings are the “guideposts” for employer liability in hostile
work-environment claims.77
1. Burlington Industries v. Ellerth
In Ellerth, Kimberly Ellerth alleged that her supervisor groped her and made
inappropriate sexual remarks over the course of several months; however,
Ellerth suffered no tangible employment actions nor did she report her
supervisor’s conduct. 78 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority,
clarified that the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” do not
control in determining liability. 79 Instead, the Court, reaffirming Meritor,
stressed that tangible employment actions are important in finding liability.80
However, the Court also held that when the harassing behavior does not result
in a tangible employment action, a claim becomes actionable when the conduct
is “severe or pervasive.”81
On the issue of liability, the Court relied on agency principles. 82 Under
agency principles, an employer is not liable for torts committed by a supervisor
acting outside the scope of employment unless the employer was “negligent or
reckless” or the supervisor was “aided in the commission of the tort by the
existence of the agency relation.” 83 The Court did not find Ellerth’s employer
76. In the 1993 case, Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Court provided further guidance on
what constitutes an actionable hostile work-environment claim by holding that a hostile
work-environment claim will be based on a totality of circumstances test. Harris, 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993) (listing the following factors as helpful for determining if harassment creates a hostile
work environment: “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance”).
77. Elsenheimer, supra note 6, at 1645.
78. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747–49. The Seventh Circuit overturned the district court’s
dismissal of Kimberly Ellerth’s claims in eight separate opinions with no consensus regarding
employer liability claims. Id. at 749.
79. Id. at 751. The Court noted that the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work
environment” were not included in Title VII, nor were they used to establish liability in Meritor.
Id. at 752 (noting that the terms serve specific and limited purposes in Meritor). The Court noted,
however, that lower courts used the terms as a benchmark for determining whether an employer
was automatically, vicariously liable, or if the employee had to prove that the harassment was
“severe or pervasive.” Id. at 754–55; see also Nancy R. Mansfield & Joan T. A. Gabel, An
Analysis of the Burlington and Faragher Affirmative Defense: When Are Employers Liable?, 19
LAB. LAW. 107, 110 (2003) (detailing the affirmative defense standard in Ellerth and Faragher).
80. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63 (explaining that under Title VII, liability for quid pro quo
harassment imputes the employer because the company empowered the supervisor to make
tangible employment decisions about the victim-employee).
81. Id. at 752.
82. Id. at 758–61 (stating that under agency principles, liability for torts committed outside
the scope of employment will still be imputed to the employer under certain situations).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1996); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
758–59 (discussing section 219(2) of the Restatement). Since it was cited by the Ellerth court,
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liable because although “[n]egligence sets a minimum standard for employer
liability under Title VII,” Ellerth did not report the harassment to her
employer.84 Despite her lack of reporting, Ellerth asserted that her employer
should be liable because the agency relation between the employee and the
supervisor enabled the supervisor’s harassment.85 Essentially, Ellerth raised a
“more stringent standard of vicarious liability.”86
Justice Kennedy, noting the tension between agency law and the Meritor
rule, 87 focused the Court’s analysis on Congress’s intent in enacting Title
VII.88 The Court found that Title VII was intended to eliminate harassment in
the workplace, a policy best supported by encouraging employers to implement
antiharassment and notification policies.89 Based on that rationale, the Court
established that an employer can still be liable even when no tangible
employment action is taken, unless it successfully raises an affirmative defense
to the claim.90 The defense consisted of two elements: “(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” 91 Furthermore, the Court held that
when a tangible employment action is taken against an employee, an employee
is strictly liable.92
Ultimately, the Court remanded the case, stating that Ellerth should be
allowed to show that the harassment was “pervasive or severe” and that the
employer should be able to assert the affirmative defense.93 Justice Thomas
the Second Restatement has published a new edition; however, section 219 remains substantively
unchanged. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.04, 7.07, 7.08 (2005).
84. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748–49, 759 (finding negligence when the employer knew or should
have known of the conduct).
85. See id. at 759.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 763. Justice Kennedy acknowledged the logic in holding employers strictly liable
under agency law because a supervisor’s superior position and ability to affect the employee’s job
status was always at least an implicit factor in the sexual harassment. Id. On the other hand,
Justice Kennedy noted that in some harassing situations the agency relation has no bearing on the
supervisor’s conduct. Id.
88. Id. at 763–64.
89. Id. (noting that Title VII was intended to encourage companies to create antiharassment
policies and more effective grievance mechanisms). The Court explained that attaching liability
to an employer’s effort to create antiharassment procedures would support “Congress’ intention
to promote reconciliation rather than litigation,” and limiting liability where an employee does
not report the harassment “could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it
becomes severe or pervasive. . . [and] serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.” Id. at 764.
90. Id. at 764–65.
91. Id. at 765.
92. Id. (explaining that the defense is not available if harassment results in a tangible
employment action).
93. Id. at 766.
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dissented, arguing that employers should only be liable if they negligently
allow harassment to occur.94
2. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Court applied the affirmative defense
set forth in Ellerth and further expounded on its underlying principles. 95
Similar to Ellerth, the facts of Faragher involved a hostile work-environment
claim that did not result in a tangible employment action. 96 Justice David
Souter, writing for the majority, elaborated on the agency principles
underpinning vicarious liability for sexual harassment by a supervisor.97
Recognizing that the Meritor holding did not make an employer
“automatically” liable under Title VII, the Court explained that the affirmative
defense outlined in Ellerth best wedded the agency principles of vicarious
liability and Meritor’s prohibition on strict liability under Title VII. 98 The
Court also asserted that Ellerth’s affirmative defense addressed Congress’s
goal of making victims whole, encouraging employers to implement
antiharassment procedures, and supporting employees to utilize these
procedures to mitigate harm. 99 Applying the affirmative defense, the Court
found that the City of Boca Raton had not taken reasonable steps to prevent
harassment.100

94. Id. at 767 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also warned that the new standard
delineated in Ellerth would lead to more litigation and perpetuate the uncertainty surrounding
employer liability. Id. at 774 (characterizing the affirmative defense outlined in Ellerth as
“vague”).
95. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
96. Id. at 780–83. Beth Ann Faragher, a part-time lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton,
Florida, alleged that two supervisors repeatedly sexually harassed her, both verbally and
physically. Id. The City adopted an antiharassment policy, but failed to circulate the policy to
Faragher’s supervisors and co-workers. Id. at 781–82.
97. Id. at 793. The Eleventh Circuit rejected vicarious liability in Faragher’s claim, holding:
(1) the supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment; (2) their harassment
was not “aided by the agency relationship;” and (3) the employer was not negligent in failing to
prevent the harassment. Id. Justice David Souter explained that although sexual harassment did
not literally fall within the scope of employment, courts have expanded the definition to include
actions that are foreseeable consequences of the workplace such as sexual harassment. Id. at
794–96. Justice Souter next concluded that supervisors are “aided by the agency relationship”
when sexually harassing a subordinate employee because of the employee’s inability to ignore or
avoid a supervisor in the workplace and their likely reluctance to risk “blowing the whistle.” Id.
at 802–03.
98. Id. at 804–05.
99. Id. at 806–07 (stating that the Ellerth affirmative defense gives deference to responsible
employers while encouraging victims to mitigate harm through reasonable means).
100. Id. at 808–10 (finding that the City failed to notify its employees of its sexual
harassment policies).
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F. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits Do Not Follow the Ellerth/Faragher Test in
Incipient or Single Incident Sexual Hostile Work-Environment Sexual
Harassment Cases
Following the Supreme Court decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, the EEOC
issued policy guidance clarifying the application of the new framework and
voicing their support for the use of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.101
In 2004, the Court reaffirmed the use of the Ellerth/Faragher defense in
Pennsylvania State Police v. Sunders.102
1. Incipient Harassment
Despite this new rule, in 1999, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.103
The case arose after Constance Indest filed a Title VII lawsuit against her
employer, Freeman Decorating, alleging that a company vice president
sexually harassed her during a week-long design convention. 104 Indest
reported the harassment to her branch manager, and the company reprimanded
the vice president.105 Indest’s employment status was not altered following the
incident.106
The district court dismissed the case before the Supreme Court announced
Ellerth and Faragher.107 When the case reached the Fifth Circuit, however, a
three-judge panel heard the case in light of the new standard articulated in
Ellerth and Faragher. 108 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal in a per curium decision, but there was no majority to provide a clear
rationale for the holding.109
The first opinion, issued by Judge Edith Jones, recognized that the case
should be examined in light of the Ellerth and Faragher decisions. 110
Nonetheless, Judge Jones did not apply the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
101. Equal Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance] available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html.
102. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133–34 (2004) (reiterating a summation of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense).
103. Indest I, 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the case on the immediate
response of the employer).
104. Id. at 260.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 260–61 (noting that Constance Indest received periodic raises after the incident).
After the company reprimanded the vice president, Indest notified the human resources director
that she intended to file a complaint with the EEOC, fearing retaliation from the vice president.
Id. The director assured Indest that no retaliation would occur and that the company would
suspend the vice president for one week. Id. at 261
107. Id. at 258, 260.
108. Id. at 263.
109. See Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 796 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., specially concurring).
110. Indest I, 164 F.3d at 260.
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defense111 and found that Freeman Decorating should not be liable because the
company promptly and properly responded to the harassment claim.112 Judge
Jones noted that holding Freeman Decorating liable for the sexual harassment
of Indest could be equated to strict liability, an outcome that runs counter to the
rule expressed in Meritor and was subsequently affirmed in Ellerth and
Faragher that Title VII does not impose absolute liability on employers.113 In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Jones distinguished the company’s quick
response to Indest’s claim from Ellerth and Faragher, cases involving repeated
harassment where the victims were unaware of or never utilized the
companies’ antiharassment policies.114 Thus, the court held that Ellerth and
Faragher did not control in “incipient” or early-stage hostile workenvironment claims.115
Judge Jacques Weiner concurred with the judgment, but rejected Judge
Jones’s abandonment of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in incipient
hostile work environments.116 Judge Weiner noted that the Supreme Court did
not expressly limit Ellerth and Faragher to exclude incipient claims.117 Judge
Weiner also rejected the argument that applying Ellerth and Faragher in
incipient sexual harassment claims would create a strict liability standard,
stressing that claims are actionable only if they are “severe or pervasive.”118
Judge Weiner found that the case should be dismissed because the harassment
did not breach the “severe or pervasive” threshold.119
Since neither Judge Jones nor Judge Weiner reached a quorum, their
opinions are not precedential.120 However, Judge Jones’s opinion has been
cited in subsequent cases holding that there is no vicarious liability when an
employer takes prompt actions to remediate sexual harassment.121
111. Under the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, Freeman Decorating would be liable
even though it responded promptly because Indest reported the harassment to the company. See
supra note 84.
112. Indest I, 164 F.3d at 264.
113. Id. at 266.
114. Id. at 265.
115. Id. at 265–66 (explaining that holding an employer liable when it “nipped the hostile
environment in the bud” would undermine Title VII’s deterrent policy).
116. Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 796 (5th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., specially concurring).
117. Id. at 798 (stating that the Court designed the Ellerth/Faragher defense to apply to all
hostile work-environment claims). Quoting the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, Judge
Weiner concluded that the Court designed the defense “as the only hatch through which an
employer might escape vicarious liability when ‘harassment by a supervisor . . . creates the
requisite degree of discrimination.” Id. at 801 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 804 (1998)).
118. Id. at 803–04.
119. Id. at 806.
120. Id. at 796 n.1; see also Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1910) (stating that a
case reached absent a quorum has no precedential weight).
121. See Kreamer v. Henry’s Towing, 150 F. App’x 378, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing
Indest I and holding that because the defendant employer “took prompt remedial action as a
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2. Single-Incident Harassment
In McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, a case involving a single incident of
sexual harassment, the Eighth Circuit also declined to apply the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.122 Jamie McCurdy, a radio dispatcher
for the Arkansas State Police (ASP), sued the ASP after a police officer
fondled and verbally harassed her during an evening shift. 123 McCurdy
reported the incident, and the officer was demoted and transferred as the result
of the ensuing investigation.124 The Eighth Circuit cited Judge Jones’s opinion
in Indest, and distinguished this single incident of sexual harassment and the
ASP’s remedial actions from Ellerth and Faragher.125 The court determined
that under the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, the ASP would be liable
despite its prompt response because McCurdy reported the incident.126 Like
Judge Jones, the Eighth Circuit rejected this outcome as creating strict liability
for employers in single-incident cases, 127 stating, “[s]trict adherence to the
Supreme Court’s two-prong affirmative defense in this case is like trying to fit
a square peg in a round hole.” 128 Thus, the court held that the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense did not apply to single-incident
harassment cases, and that employers were vicariously liable only under a
negligence theory.129 Because the ASP took “swift and effective action,” it
was not negligent.130
G. The Tenth Circuit and United States District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana Apply the Full Ellerth/Faragher Defense in Incipient and
Single-Incident Cases
In 2001, in Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., the Tenth Circuit diverged from
the Fifth Circuit and applied the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to an
matter of law” the employer is not liable). In later opinions, Judge Weiner has reiterated that
neither of the Indest opinions are precedential, but has applied the Ellerth and Faragher defense
in full by distinguishing the cases from the facts of Indest. See, e.g., Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213
F.3d 278, 283 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Marks, supra note 70, at 1423–24.
122. 375 F.3d 762, 774 (8th Cir. 2003).
123. Id. at 764.
124. Id. at 765, 767.
125. Id. at 773–74 (citing Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999)).
126. Id. at 774.
127. Id.; see supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text (outlining Judge Jones’s arguments
for limiting the defense).
128. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 771.
129. See id. at 771, 773.
130. Id. at 773–74 (“We conclude by applauding the ASP for its swift and effective response
to McCurdy’s report of the single instance of sexual harassment. Title VII forbids sexual
harassment in the workplace, and the ASP followed this prohibition . . . .”). In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Michael Melloy rejected this limitation of Ellerth and Faragher as unsupported by
the text of those opinions and noted that the EEOC supported application of both prongs of the
affirmative defense in all situations. Id. at 775–76 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
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incipient-harassment claim. 131 Jeanne Harrison, a mineworker, filed a Title
VII sexual harassment claim after enduring two months of severe sexual
harassment and assault by her supervisor. 132 The case reached the Tenth
Circuit after the district court ruled in favor of Harrison by applying the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.133 On appeal, the employer asserted that
it should not have been required to meet the second element of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, an argument consistent with Judge
Jones’s opinion in Indest.134 The Tenth Circuit refuted this argument, finding
that the district court correctly applied the full Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense.135 The Tenth Circuit rejected the employer’s position for a number of
reasons. First, it noted that the lack of a majority opinion in Indest stripped
either opinion of any precedential authority. 136 Rather, the Harrison court
relied on Tenth Circuit precedent that upheld the use of the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense, even when an employer took prompt action to remedy the
harassment.137 Additionally, the court also noted significant factual differences
between the conduct in Indest and the severe conduct Harrison alleged.138
More recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana applied the full Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in a
single-incident case in Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp.139 Annastacia Alalade
filed a sexual harassment claim against her employer AWS alleging that her
supervisor sexually assaulted her. 140 Alalade promptly complained to her

131. 248 F.3d 1014, 1024–26 (10th Cir. 2001).
132. Id. at 1016–18 (describing a number of occasions when Harrison’s supervisor forced her
to perform sexual acts in isolated areas of the mine).
133. Id. at 1020–23. The court found for Harrison on the grounds that the employer could
not meet both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, because although the
employer acted promptly upon notification of the conduct, Harrison did not unreasonably delay
filing the complaint against her supervisor. Id. at 1024.
134. Id. (rejecting the company’s argument that Indest correctly limited the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense).
135. Id. at 1026.
136. Id. at 1025. The Tenth Circuit explained, “As outlined in Indest II, there is no reason to
believe that the ‘remarkably straightforward’ framework outlined in Faragher and Burlington
does not control all cases in which a plaintiff employee seeks to hold his or her employer
vicariously liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment.” Id. at 1026 (quoting Indest II, 168 F.3d
795, 796 (5th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., specially concurring)).
137. Id. at 1025–26 (citing Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th
Cir. 1998)). In Gunnell, the Tenth Circuit held that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
applied even where the employer ultimately stopped further harassment. Gunnell, 152 F.3d at
1261.
138. Harrison, 248 F.3d at 1026 (distinguishing the Indest facts from the more severe
misconduct in the present case).
139. 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 944 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
140. Id. at 937. A full description of the events can be found in the district court’s denial of
summary judgment for AWS. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., No. 3:09-CV-338-PPS, 2011
WL 1884339, *1-3 (N.D. Ind. May 18, 2011).
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employer, and her supervisor was terminated. 141 The district court denied
AWS’s summary judgment motion, and AWS filed a motion to reconsider on
the grounds that it should not have had to satisfy the second element of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense because it had promptly responded to
Alalade’s complaint.142
The court first explained that although Ellerth and Faragher involved
prolonged harassment, Ellerth and Faragher did not suggest that the rulings
were not intended to include single-incident harassment cases.143 The court
conceded that the modification for single-incident sexual harassment claims
asserted by AWS and used in McCurdy would incentivize employers to take
preventative steps to end sexual harassment.144 The court contended, however,
that disregarding the second element of the test would ignore the goal of
encouraging employees to mitigate harm by reporting harassment.145 Thus, the
court denied AWS’s motion to reconsider.146
II. REVIEWING THE REASONING IN THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: STARE DECISIS AND
STRICT LIABILITY CONCERNS
A. Stare Decisis: The Sixth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit Narrow the Ellerth
and Faragher Holdings, While the Tenth Circuit and the Alalade Court Follow
Precedent
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits in Indest and McCurdy interpreted Ellerth and
Faragher to apply only to cases involving sexual harassment that occurred
over a period of time.147 In incipient and single-instance harassment cases, the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits limit the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to its
first element, imputing liability only if the employer failed to take steps to
prevent sexual harassment or did not properly respond to complaints.148 This
approach essentially imposes the “negligence” standard Justice Thomas urged
in his dissenting opinion in Ellerth. 149 The negligence standard, however,
141. Alalade, 2011 WL 1884339, at *1.
142. Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 937–38.
143. Id. at 940. AWS argued that employers with antiharassment policies and who promptly
respond to complaints should only have to satisfy the first element of the defense to avoid liablity.
Id. at 944. The court rejected this argument: “[t]he Supreme Court did not see fit to carve off
single-instance harassment cases for special treatment under Ellerth and Faragher. So even if I
was convinced Ellerth/Faragher’s second prong should not apply to single-instance harassment
cases, that would not permit me to modify the defense here.” Id. at 946.
144. Id. at 945.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 945–56.
147. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2004); Indest I, 164 F.3d 258,
265 (5th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the Ellerth and Faragher facts from situations where the
employer takes prompt remedial action upon receiving a complaint).
148. See McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 773–74; Indest I, 164 F.3d at 266–67.
149. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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ignores the Court’s holding that negligence merely sets the floor for employer
liability, and that even non-negligent employers can be liable for hostile
work-environment claims.150
Indeed, in Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court did not include any
language limiting the application of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
to strictly analogous patterns of discrimination.151 In fact, Meritor, Ellerth, and
Faragher—the Court’s seminal opinions on employer liability for sexual
harassment—all noted that the existence of an antiharassment policy should
not wholly shield an employer from liability.152
In Ellerth and Faragher, the Court discussed other limits on the application
of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. For instance, the defense only
applies to alleged harassment by a “supervisor,”153 and states that an employer
should be liable only for coworker-on-coworker sexual harassment under the
negligence standard.154 Thus, it seems probable that, if the Court wished to
limit the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to longer patterns of
harassment, it would have said as much. Judge Weiner’s concurrence in
Indest, the Tenth Circuit in Harrison, and the district court in Alalade all
explained that, absent specific limitations from the Court, the full
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense should be followed.155

150. See McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 759.
151. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (citing Ellerth’s holding
that employers are vicariously liable for an actionable hostile work environment created by a
supervisor).
152. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (stating that the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense can be satisfied or refined in multiple ways and is not limited to a finding of
employer grievance procedures); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792 (noting that Meritor held that neither
the mere existence of a grievance procedure nor the lack of notice of harassment was enough to
automatically shield an employer from liability); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
72–73 (1986) (“[W]e reject the petitioner’s view that the mere existence of a grievance procedure
or policy against discrimination, coupled with the respondent’s failure to invoke that procedure
must insulate petitioner from liability.”).
153. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63. Interestingly, the McCurdy
court noted that even under the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, the ASP might not be liable
because no agency relationship existed, as the offending police officer was not McCurdy’s
supervisor. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 773.
154. See e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760, 762 (explaining that the “aided by agency”
requirement for imputing liability on employers does not encompass coworker harassment, even
though the agency relationship afforded the coworker-harasser proximity to the victim).
155. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1104, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding no support
for the claim that the Court intended to limit the application of the Ellerth/Faragher defense)
(citing Indest II, 168 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., specially concurring)); Indest II,
168 F.3d at 796 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that Ellerth and Faragher apply to all hostile
work-environment claims); Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940 (N.D.
Ind. 2011).
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B. Strict Liability: The Fifth and Eighth Circuits Equate the Application of
Ellerth/Faragher as Imposing Strict Liability on Employers
Central to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher
is the notion that Title VII does not hold employers strictly liable for all
supervisor-sexual harassment in the workplace. 156 The Fifth and Tenth
Circuits justify their departures from the Ellerth/Faragher defense by claiming
that the defense’s application to incipient or single-instance sexual harassment
cases imposes liability on the employer regardless of any preventative
measures in place.157
Judge Weiner’s concurrence in Indest and the district court’s opinion in
Alalade took a more holistic view of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
and did not find that it imposed strict liability.158 These decisions noted that
the threshold question before the application of the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense is even reached is whether the sexual harassment was so
“severe” or “pervasive” that it creates a hostile work environment. 159
Therefore, this high threshold results in a built-in defense to imposing strict
liability on employers. 160 If employers promptly respond to harassment
claims, rarely will sexual harassment create a work environment “so polluted
with discrimination” that it becomes actionable under Title VII. 161 Indeed,
Judge Jones in Indest noted that because the employer promptly handled the

156. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 524; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71.
157. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 772 (stating that imposing liability after an employer’s quick and
appropriate response is in contrast to Meritor’s holding and creates strict liability); Indest I, 164
F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999) (claiming that vicarious liability would amount to strict liability and
undermine Meritor where an employer is held vicariously liable even though it responded quickly
and appropriately to the sexual harassment claim).
158. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 803 (Weiner, J., specially concurring) (stating the fear of strict
liability is “as unwarranted as it is inaccurate”); Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 945 (disputing the
argument that applying the full defense conflicts with Meritor’s rejection of strict liability). For a
detailed discussion of why the Ellerth/Faragher standard does not impose strict liability, see
Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for
Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 529, 635 (2006) (arguing that the Ellerth/Faragher does not go far enough in
holding employers strictly liable).
159. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788–89; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751.
160. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (noting that isolated incidents do not rise to the level of a
hostile-work environment, ensuring that Title VII is not transformed into a “general civility
code”); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (explaining that a hostile
work-environment is determined by looking at a variety of factors including frequency and
severity of the conduct, its physically threatening or humiliating nature, and the degree to which it
interferes with the victim’s work. The opinion distinguishes severe actionable conduct from
“mere offensive utterance[s]”); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,
238 (5th Cir. 1972)) (stating that a sexual harassment claim is only actionable if it is “severe or
pervasive” enough to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment) (internal citations omitted).
161. See Indest II, 168 F.3d at 804 (explaining that the threat of liability for sexual
harassment motivates employers).
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harassment, no hostile work environment ever existed. 162 Judge Weiner
argued that the case should be dismissed on the same grounds.163 Additionally,
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies to “liability or damages,”164
thereby allowing an employer to shield itself from damages that accrue after an
employee should have reasonably reported the harassment.165
It is true that if the full defense is required in incipient or single-incident
contexts where the harassment is severe enough to be actionable, employers
will still be liable, even if they respond promptly upon learning of the
harassment.166 These situations do resemble the strict liability situations that
Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher prohibit.167 Yet, the EEOC points out that this
result is consistent with other Title VII violations, and the employer can still
limit damages by promptly thwarting the harassment.168
Additionally, shielding the employer from liability in these situations will
often leave the employee-victim without a means to recover damages for his or
her injury outside of a tort action.169 Shielding employers also contradicts Title
VII’s policy of allowing recovery from the “deep[er]-pocket[ed]” employer.170
162. Indest I, 164 F.3d at 264 (finding that brief exposure to the harassment did not amount
to an actionable hostile work environment in light of the high demanding structure).
163. Indest II, 168 F.3d at 803–04.
164. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
165. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806–07 (noting that a plaintiff should not recover if she
occasionally failed to utilize existing preventative or remedial procedures).
166. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72–73.
167. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72;
168. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 101, at *7 (“While this result may seem harsh to a
law-abiding employer, it is consistent with liability standards under the antidiscrimination statutes
that generally make employers responsible for the discriminatory acts of their supervisor”). The
EEOC also noted that the employer would still be liable where harm occurred even though
requisite action was taken by the employer. Id. at *7. While a negligence standard would
absolve employer liability in that situation, the EEOC has held that the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense does not. Id. In fact, the EEOC expressly rejected the holding in Indest I:
The Commission agrees with Judge Wiener that Ellerth and Faragher do control the
analysis in [incipient] cases, and that an employee’s prompt complaint to management
forecloses the employer from proving the affirmative defense. However, as Judge
Wiener pointed out, an employer’s quick remedial action will often thwart the creation
of an unlawful hostile environment, rendering any consideration of employer liability
unnecessary.
Id. at *7 n.46.
169. See Joanna Stromberg, Sexual Harassment: Discrimination or Tort?, 12 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 317, 326–27 (2003). Stromberg argues that Title VII suits, rather common law
tort suits, provide the plaintiff with a better opportunity to recover from an employer for sexual
harassment. Id. at 326. Stromberg notes that Title VII’s intent standard is lower and courts
recognize that more acts qualify as harassment under Title VII than under traditional common
law. Id. at 327.
170. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 757. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was
passed, in part, to allow monetary recovery from employers for discrimination than in the hopes
that risk of financial losses would cause employers to eradicate proactively discrimination from
the workplace. See Sandra Tafuri, Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision: Are Employees Protected
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Furthermore, the Court noted in Faragher that imposing liability, or the threat
of liability, for the actions of supervisors encourages employers to screen,
train, and monitor supervisors more closely.171
Moreover, many scholars suggest that courts “are unduly impressed” by a
company that has a sexual harassment policy in place, finding that the
existence of a policy alone satisfies the first prong of the test.172 Thus, if the
court were to modify the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to only the first
element, an employer could entirely shield itself from liability by having a
policy in place, regardless of the effectiveness or level of implementation of
the policy. 173 In the words of the Alalade court, this result “creates an
exception that swallows the Ellerth/Faragher rule.”174
Therefore, the full application of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
strikes the better balance. Employers possess the ability to shield themselves
from liability or damages by responding promptly to sexual harassment and
preventing a hostile work environment from materializing, yet employees are
not barred from recovery simply because an antiharassment policy exists.

After the Employment Relationship Has Ended?, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 797, 816–18 (1996)
(discussing the changes made to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
171. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (noting that because there are fewer supervisors than
employees, employers have a greater ability to control and monitor supervisors’ actions, making
the imposition of greater liability more fair); see also Tafuri, supra note 170, at 817 (noting that
Title VII’s monetary damages gave incentive for enforcement of the statute).
172. David J. Walsh, Small Change: An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supreme Court
Precedents on Federal Appeals Court Decisions in Sexual Harassment Cases, 1993-2005, 30
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 461, 472–73 (2009); see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of
Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence
of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 1, 5 (2001) (noting “the willingness of some courts to defer to procedures that lack due process
protections and the full panoply of remedies existing under Title VII raises grave concerns about
the ability of grievance procedures to vindicate employee rights.”). A study of employment
sexual harassment cases conducted three years after Ellerth and Faragher found that in all but
one case, courts held that employers that disseminated an antiharassment policy to all employees
had satisfied the reasonable care requirement, summarizing, “the law is relatively clear: a
so-called ‘good policy’ constitutes “reasonable care.” David Sherwyn, Michael Heise, & Zev J.
Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An
Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual
Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1290 (2001).
173. Sherwyn, supra note 172, at 1290.
174. Alalade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 2d 936, 944 (N.D. Ind. 2011). The
court explained that the reasoning for narrowly applying the Ellerth/Faragher framework was to
avoid punishing an employer who has satisfied his or her duty to prevent and address harassment.
Id. However, the court stated that this rationale applies equally to employers who responded
promptly after being alerted to harassments in cases involving prolonged harassment, so,
extended, the argument would suggest dropping the second element whenever the first element is
met. Id. at 944–45.
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III. TENTH CIRCUIT AND ALALADE COURT CAN BETTER ACCOMPLISH TITLE
VII’S PREVENTION GOAL BY ENCOURAGING PROMPT REPORTING OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
The Supreme Court has often repeated that Title VII’s ultimate goal is to rid
the workplace of discrimination. 175 The statutory purpose resonates in the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, which seeks to eliminate sexual
harassment by encouraging implementation of employer anti-harassment
policies by offering an affirmative defense, while also incentivizing employee
reporting.176
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits as well as the Alalade court all emphasized
Title VII’s deterrence goal. 177 However, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’
elimination of the second element of the defense does not deter sexual
harassment in the workplace as strongly as the full Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense.178 Under the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ rule, an employee
who suffers incipient or single-instance harassment may come forward to
thwart future harassment, but will receive no remedy for the harm already
suffered if the employer establishes that it responded to the harassment
promptly and adequately.179 This result serves as a disincentive for employees
to report harassment, undermines the deterrence goal of Title VII, and prohibits
Title VII’s goal to provide victims an avenue to recover for their harms.180
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit’s and the Alalade approach creates an
incentive for employees to report harassment, because failure to do so shields

175. See e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995); EEOC
v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984).
176. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (upholding Title VII’s
“basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting
employee[s]”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998).
177. McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 775 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The underlying
theme under Title VII is employers should nip harassment in the bud.”); Indest I, 164 F.3d 258,
365 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he purpose of Title VII, which cannot guarantee civility in the American
workplace but, at its best, inspires prophylactic measures to deter unwanted sexual harassment.”);
Aladale, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
178. See Alalade, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 944–45.
179. Id. at 944.
180. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 726 (2000) (“The typical employee will weigh the
consequences of reporting against the benefits that will likely accrue to her personally. Because
she has no incentive to internalize the potential benefits to other employees, the level of reporting
may be dampened.”). Grossman argues that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense itself can
disincentivize reporting because once an employee fails to report the first incident, he or she will
be foreclosed from recovering damages and has less reason to file a complaint. Id. at 721; see
also Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 900–05 (2008) (discussing the myriad of reasons why employees do
not bring harassment charges, including fear of alienation from peers and fear of retaliation from
supervisors).
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the employer from liability. 181 Title VII’s deterrence goal is accomplished
more meaningfully when reporting prompts an employer to eliminate sexual
harassment in its early stages.182
Indeed, recent studies have shown that less than half of all women who sue
their employers for sexual harassment report the behavior, 183 a statistic
attributed to fear of retaliation, general skepticism, and ambivalence towards
sexual harassment.184 In 2010, at the height of the current economic downturn,
in which 14 million Americans were unemployed and another 8.8 million were
underemployed, 185 the reporting problem was exacerbated, leaving sexual
harassment victims unwilling to leave their jobs and unlikely to risk speaking
out.186 In light of this, it is even more important for courts to use Title VII as
an incentive for employees to report sexual harassment, and the Tenth Circuit
and Alalade court’s approach better encourages reporting by allowing
employees to recover from employers under Title VII, even when the
employers have an antiharassment policy in place.187

181. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 101, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001); Alalade, 796 F.
Supp. 2d at 945–46.
182. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 803–04 (8th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J.,
specially concurring).
183. See, Chamallas, supra note 72, at 374 (citing a recent study of federal workers finding
that approximately ten percent of employees reported their harassment). Chamallas also notes
that, of the employees who sued their employers for harassment, nearly half did not report the
harassment at first. Id.; see also MINK, supra note 52, at 77 (noting that an estimated ninety-five
percent of harassment goes unreported).
184. See, e.g., MINK, supra note 52, at 76–77 (discussing the skepticism women face in
reporting harassment); Saguy, supra note 1, at 81–82 (chronicling the media’s response to sexual
harassment around the time of Ellerth and Faragher as delegitimizing sexual harassment in “a
backlash against feminism”).
185. Paul Wiseman & Christopher Leonard, Dismal Jobs Data Shakes World Markets,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 5, 2011), available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Dismal
-jobs-data-shakes-world-apf-1614624743.html.
186. Dana Mattoli, More Men Make Harassment Claims, WALL ST. J., March 23, 2010, at
D4. Mattoli’s article interviews attorney Greg Grant who explains the problem:
In the past, victims of harassment—especially men—have ‘voted with their feet’ and
found new jobs rather than turning to the legal system . . . . When they can’t get other
jobs and they still have to pay the bills and support families’ they have to either live
with the harassment or risk the potential stigma of speaking out.
Id.
187. By passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which allowed increased damages for
discrimination victims, Congress stressed the important role monetary relief plays in encouraging
victims to file discrimination claims.
Congress explained that victims of intentional
discrimination would otherwise not be compensated for their injuries nor encouraged to
“vindicate their civil rights.” H.R. Rep. 102-40, pt. 2, at 25 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 718. Some commentators believe that Title VII remedies are ineffective in
encouraging employees to vindicate their rights, arguing instead for language broadening Title
VII so all victims can recover from their harasser, instead of just from the employer. See, e.g.,
Tracy L. Gonos, A Policy Analysis of Individual Liability—the Case for Amending Title VII to

1156

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:1131

IV. CONCLUSION
After a long struggle, courts finally recognize that Title VII affords
important protection for employees from sexual harassment by supervisors.188
The Supreme Court crafted the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to resolve
the tension between imputing absolute liability on employers under agency
principles and Title VII’s proscription of strict liability, while at the same time
promoting Title VII’s goal of eliminating workplace discrimination. 189
However, currently the Fifth and Eighth Circuits depart from the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in single- and incipient-harassment
situations, applying only the first element of the defense.190 In an attempt to
justify this departure, these circuits arguably overstate the imposition of strict
liability, and do not meet Title VII’s goal of deterring sexual harassment by
encouraging employees to report harassment. The Supreme Court should end
this departure by articulating that the full Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
must be applied in situations of incipient- or single-instance sexual harassment
cases, as the Tenth Circuit and Alalade court presently do. Furthermore, given
the current challenges faced by employee-victims of sexual harassment, the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense better meets Title VII’s deterrence goal
by encouraging, rather than foreclosing on, an employee’s ability to recover for
harms.
This framework provides assurance that Title VII will remain a
powerful tool to combat sexual harassment in the workplace.

Hold Individuals Personally Liable for Their Illegal Discriminatory Actions, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 265, 281 (1999).
188. See supra Part I.B.
189. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998).
190. See generally supra Part II.B.

